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Analysing Risk Management in Banks: Evidence of Bank Efficiency and 
Macroeconomic Impact 
 
Abstract 
The recent Global Economic meltdown triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis of United 
States in 2007 and its adverse effect on financial markets and participants in the financial industry 
worldwide have resulted in a capital management crisis in most financial institutions especially 
banks. This study is a case for the Nigerian banking industry, focusing on factors affecting risk 
management efficiency in banks. For empirical investigation, we employed Panel regression 
analysis taking a stratum of time series data and cross-sectional variants of macro and bank-
specific factors for period covering 2003 to 2009. Result for panel regression indicates that risk 
management efficiency in Nigerian banks is not just affected by bank-specific factors but also by 
macroeconomic variables. This describes the pro-cyclicality of bank performance in the Nigerian 
banking sector. As it stands, the sufficiency of Basel principles for risk management is doubtful 
because asset quality varies with business cycles.  
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1. Introduction 
The recent Global Economic meltdown caused by the subprime mortgage crisis in the US 
in July 2007 and its adverse effect on financial markets and participants in the financial 
industry worldwide has triggered a capital management crisis in most financial institutions, 
especially banks. In market-based countries where capital market dominates economic 
activities, banks have suffered a severe shock in their capital and liquidity status due to the 
unanticipated downturn in the financial market and a credit crunch experience in the 
financial industry. This made a number of banks go illiquid and some even closed down 
operations. For instance, total of 168 banks were reported to have closed down within the 
period spanning from 2007 to 2009 in US (FDIC, 2010).  
Last year, Nigerian banking industry suffered an historic retrogressive trend in both 
profitability and capitalization. Just 3 out of 24 banks declared profit, 8 banks were said to 
be in „grave‟ situation due to capital inadequacy and risk asset depletion; the capital market 
slummed by about 70 percent and most banks had to recapitalize to meet the regulatory 
directive (CBN, 2010). This drama in the banking sector eroded public confidence in 
banking and depositors‟ funds aggregately dropped by 41% in the period. Possibly due to 
financial liberalization and globalization, the fact is there has been a reckless abandonment 
of the essentials of managing risk in times of economic boom and recession; the volatility 
of bank earnings has been under-rated by bank managements. The central monetary 
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authorities also impacted negatively on stability of the sector. The auditing exercise was a 
very good one but the sanctity and policy implementation mode was bad considering the 
nature of the Nigerian economy.  
Basically, bank objectives revolve around 3 directions: profitability, growth in asset and 
customer base. Aremu et al. (2010) pointed out that the major problem of bank 
management is the mis-prioritization of short term goals over its long term objectives. 
While the profitability centers on the quality of short term repriceable assets and liabilities, 
net worth expansion which is the equity capital, is a function of total asset and liability. In 
Nigeria, it has been observed that most bank managers have focused more on profitability 
(which usually is a short term objective), with little attention on risk managing the quality 
of assets which has better impact on the long term sustainability of a financial institution.  
In June 2004, a new accord of capital management was proposed by the Basel 
committee on bank supervision and its focus was to establish an international standard that 
banking regulators can use when creating regulations about how much capital banks need 
to reserve in order to cover for credit and operational risks (BIS, 2004). Following this 
guide, in 2005, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) raised the capital requirement for banks 
to N25 billion from N2billion. In addition, new prudential guidelines were set. At the end 
of the exercise, only 24 banks emerged out of 88. Some of the impacts of the exercise 
include: broadened scope of banking operations ranging from aggressive market 
expansion, increased capital assets, increased participation in the stock market, and 
increased investment in the petroleum and real estate sector. An overall implication of this 
is the increased „unleveled‟ competition in the industry. They were constrained to offer 
loans and other forms of credit, providing loans to both the suitable and „dubious‟ client. 
This resulted in increased risk assets and actual capital of most banks was eroded by the 
loan defaults. 
In 2009, a new governor of CBN was appointed to oversee the affairs of the money 
sector. At inception, Mallam Lamido Sanusi, the new CBN governor, ordered a thorough 
stress-test for all commercial banks. At the end, the CBN had to inject N620billion to 
rescue 8 troubled banks. Five others were given ultimatum to recapitalize (CBN, 2010). 
The sector became unstable, many employees lost their jobs, investors lost their funds; 
some of the executive directors were arrested and charged to court for giving loans without 
due process. With the intervention of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC), it was discovered that most of the bad loans were used to finance private 
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businesses of the directors, their friends and family; a large proportion of the loan became 
classified as non-performing asset.  
Although Basel II accord has been criticized for its inadequacy in defining what 
constitutes a bank‟s capital, it has extensively provided a basis for risk management in 
banks. The objective of this study is to analyze banking risk and how bank managers and 
central regulatory authorities have been able to mitigate the protracted inadequacies of 
bank capital and liquidity issues. It infuses the exigency of capital adequacy and gap 
management into a stylized propagation for managing bank risks, in addition to wedging 
macroeconomic determinants. Various indicators such as profitability ratios, liquidity 
ratios, leverage, and efficiency index are used to assess the risks undertaken by Nigerian 
banks. Macroeconomic components such as GDP growth rate and inflation are included in 
our modeling to determine whether efficiency in managing bank-specific risk is sufficient, 
especially the trend in an unstable business cycle.  
A central focus of the BASEL guide has been on capital adequacy as a cushioning 
mechanism for risk exposure of bank assets. In other words, a higher exposure of a 
financial institution to credit and operation risk will require an augmentation of its capital 
to safeguard future operation in case of losses from such risk. For this purpose, we propose 
a dynamic financial statement analysis of various banks‟ balance sheet and income 
statements. Subsequently, a panel data analysis is used to check if risk management 
efficiency of a bank is sufficient to keep capital and liquidity, or other macroeconomic 
determinants which pose a systemic threat can be considered relevant as well in the case of 
Nigeria. This will help in showing the nexus between quality of capital, risk asset, and 
bank value (total asset). Macroeconomic indicators will also be considered in the model to 
reflect the cyclicality bank operations to economic changes.  
Basic questions to be answered will include: What are the common risks faced by 
Nigerian Banks? Do these risks concord with those identified by the Bank for International 
Settlement? What is the direction for risk management of the banks taking cognizance of 
business cycles? How can banks sustain a regime of quality asset, high earnings and ensure 
capital adequacy with no recourse to capital market performance? To answer this course, 
this study will focus on 9 top Nigerian banks (based on total asset-base). Based on 
collected data, sourced from consolidated financial statements of each bank, it is clear that 
the selected banks account for about 78% of the total assets of commercial banks in 
Nigeria. The financial statement analysis will cover the period from 2003 to 2009. This 
period witnessed symbolic reforms, transformation, profit explosion and credit crunch.  
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Statement of the Problem: 
As noted by Saunders and Wilson (2001), a common feature in banking industry around 
the world is the increasing number of insolvent banks. Emerging events have proved the 
weakness of the Basel Standards. The shortcomings of the Basel I led to a re-structuring of 
its tenets and a subsequent re-birth of the Basel II Accord. The recent world financial 
downturn also exposes the inadequacies of the Basel II which focus on capital adequacy. A 
new framework tagged Basel III has been proposed and the new banking guide has been 
scheduled to be implemented in the G20 economies starting from 31
st
 of December 2011. 
A major concern of the Basel framework is its inability to explain systemic risk which 
could come as a result of economic changes. Its applicability to developing countries such 
as in the case of Nigeria has also raised more questions.  
For a directional supposition of intent on this study, the following problems have been 
identified: 
 Sharp practices in the capital market by managers of quoted Nigerian banks; the actual 
consequence of under-capitalization of banks 
 Bad corporate governance from reckless spending by top management 
 Leverage choice of capital and poor asset quality including the issue of duration 
management, financing long-term assets with short-term liabilities 
 Risk quantification and mitigation 
 Inefficiency of regulatory/supervisory authority 
 Poor credit control which has escalated the incidence of counter-party risk; 
 Large exposure of institutions to market risk, with huge amount of margin loans 
 Cyclicality of the banking industry in Nigeria 
Objectives of the Study: 
The topicality of this research is from the prevailing argument of whether banks have been 
efficient in its goal of making profit for owners, matching repriceable assets with short 
term liabilities (liquidity management) and capital structuring and allocation. Risk 
management based on Basel convention; can we say it is sufficient framework for 
managing risk? Juan and Constantinos (2005) has rightly pointed out that implementation 
of Basel II requires an integration of a supporting financial system that can operate beyond 
banking supervision and establish the necessary institutional framework for easy 
functioning of the financial system. In developing countries, this complementary 
superstructure is unavailable or may involve high cost.  
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The aim of this work is to analyze the main components and quality of bank assets in 
Nigeria; also it examines the effect of risk-taking on bank value, cyclicality of the industry 
and the intrigues of risk management in Nigerian banking industry. The structure of work 
is as follows: first section is the introductory part which aims at giving a background of the 
study, statement of problems, objectives and the significance of the research. Section two 
reviews related literatures on risk management in banks. It provides a broad definition of 
the concept. It also provides an overview of bank regulation- reasons for bank regulation; 
its pros and cons. The third section describes the methodology for analyzing this topic. 
Section four analyzes results and findings. And section five gives a summary of our 
findings, policy recommendation and concludes the study. 
2. Literature Review 
It is a common practice that profit-maximising firms, including banks, consider operational 
miscalculation which could be as a result of macroeconomic risks, such as the effect of 
interest rates, inflation or even business cyclicality. Also, microeconomic risks like new 
competitive threats are inevitable and should be dealt with adequately. Bank-wide issues 
such as technological failures, commercial inefficiency of a supplier or customer, political 
manipulation, X-inefficiency and natural disaster are possible risks faced by banks and 
other financial institutions. Furthermore, the debacle in the financial and non-financial 
sector as a result of the contagious subprime crisis in US is a strong indication of the need 
for risk management. According to Pyle (1997), financial misadventure is not really a new 
phenomenon but the rapidity of economic downturn caused by this has necessitated the 
need for integrating an efficient risk management system. The past few decades has 
witnessed growing interest of experts in the field. While some writers have instituted an 
argument of what kind of risk management model should be adopted by deposit taking 
financial institutions, others have suggested more stringent regulatory options.  
Risk management involves risk identification, risk measurement (and quantification), 
and mitigation. However, a point to note here is the perception of what constitutes risk to a 
firm may differ from institution to institution, time to time, and industry to industry. This 
section identifies the theoretical meaning of risk management as defined by different 
scholars. 
The etymology of the word “Risk” can be traced to the Latin word “Rescum” meaning 
Risk at Sea or that which cuts (Raghavan, 2003). Risk simply implies a possibility of 
unexpected outcome. It creates the notion that future events may have some degree of 
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uncertainty, thereby exposing an institution to adversity. From Emmett (1997) definition, it 
is clear that risk is a condition of the real world; it crafts from an undesirable event. 
Undesirable event in this context is described as an adverse deviation from a desired 
outcome that is expected and hoped for. 
As it is the major goal of a firm to maximize benefits from cash flows and market 
status, managers usually achieve their objective through series of activities ranging from 
product sales, deposit acceptance, provision of funds to clients, etc. For as long as profit is 
a goal, risk is inevitable for financial institutions. Industrial concerns and product 
companies are well characterized as risk averters. Thus, financial institutions are prompted 
to seek out risk to make money. The difference in taking reasonable risk is key to financial 
firms‟ profitability and asset growth. Risk permeates everything they do (Casserley, 1991). 
At the core of this, scholars are in accordance with the fact that risk in financial institutions 
cannot be fully eliminated. However, what stands as an argument is how efficient a bank 
can manage its risk exposures- minimizing risk, at the same time ensuring profit 
maximization. Should it be through capital augmentation, allocation, or aggressive asset 
pricing? 
Ozturk (2007) defines risk management as the process by which managers satisfy their 
risk taking needs by identifying key risks, obtaining consistent, understandable, operational 
risk measures, choosing which risks to reduce and which to increase and by what means, 
and establishing procedures to monitor the resulting risk position. In other words, risk 
management is the process of assessing operational dangers of a particular position, 
measuring its magnitude, and mitigating such exposures in order not to deter the 
institutional goals of the banking firm.  
Before the 1980s, risk management functions attracted little attention. This has changed 
in recent times, occasioned by an influx of mathematicians, actuaries, behavioral scientists 
and marketers which have developed new approaches to managing risk in banks. The 
changing dynamics of banking activities, the subjected environments within which banks 
operate, and the volatility of the world economy imply that risk analysis and management 
must also adjust with time (McNamee, 1997). Risk management is becoming more 
complicated with the trend towards an integrated global financial system. It is no longer 
sufficient for risk managers to be attentive to happenings in international markets; 
efficiency of overseas risk managers has become a co-factor. An example is the subprime 
mortgage crisis in US 2007 which turned to a global syndrome. 
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Risk Management is a course at the center of financial intermediaries‟ operations which 
entails identifying, measuring, and managing risks to ensure that: 
a)  Individuals understand the intrigues of taking and managing risks 
b) Risk exposure of an institution is within an acceptable limit defined by the regulatory 
body 
c) Risk taking decisions of an institution is in line with the business strategy and defined 
objectives of the Board of directors 
d) Risk taken is worth its accruable benefits and is to the best interest of the institution; 
e) Sufficient capital is available to cushion for possible losses from taking a risk. 
3. Methodology and Variable Description 
A core objective of this study as earlier stated is to check the efficiency of banks risk 
management usually determined by bank-specific factors indicated by profitability and 
other performance indices. Progressively, Panel analysis will be used to check the impact 
of macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth and inflation rate, in addition to bank-
specific factors on bank capital adequacy in Nigeria. The primary aim of risk management 
in banks is to avert situation of insolvency. Hence, efficiency of risk management in banks 
signals their solvency level. According to Saunders and Cornett (2006), insolvency has 
been characterized by prolonged liquidity issues and severe capital depletion. In this case, 
insolvency may result in 2 ways. Firstly, insolvency forced by liquidity, in the case of 
bankruptcy where short term obligations cannot be met and the bank is forced to liquidate 
part of its assets below their market worth. Secondly, we look at insolvency which results 
from capital inadequacy. In this case, liability of the bank may become greater than the 
asset thereby forcing the bank to close business. However, closing business is an extreme 
scenario this study will not be going deep into.  
3.1 Capital Adequacy as Indicator of Risk Management Efficiency 
It has been noted that Basel framework for risk management is centered on capital 
adequacy, where internal risk models are in a way that capital augmentation is suggested to 
cover for possible consequences of risk-taking (Ojo, 2008). In this case, the capital 
adequacy requirement forms the core of prudential regulation and supervision. In legal 
terms, capital adequacy is a term used to describe the adequacy of a bank‟s aggregate 
capital in relation to the risks which arise from its asset portfolio, off-balance sheet 
transactions, its common operations and all other risks associated with its business 
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(Hitchins et al., 2001). Although Basel recognized capital buffer for level of risk-taking, it 
failed to consider a situation where risk is taken and capital value becomes affected by 
other unforeseen conditions like capital market downturn which evaporates equity capital 
of banks.  
A nexus between the bank‟s equity capital and stages of economic cycle is a bigger part 
of an on-going debate regarding the pro-cyclicality of bank capital augmentation. During 
economic boom, banks augment capital base through plowback profits and increased 
participation in the capital market; while in periods of contraction, raising capital may be 
difficult because of high cost of funds. Moreover, rapidity of loan defaults which 
negatively affects banks‟ profitability and capital position is a common feature of 
cyclicality of the banking sector (Sathye et al., 2003). In a similar outlook, Saunders and 
Wilson (2001) test for sensitivity of business-cycle in the relationship between bank 
charter value and capital for risk-taking incentives. A positive relationship between capital 
adequacy and economic cycles was established (see further examples in, Borio et al., 2001; 
Nier and Zicchino, 2005; and Wu and Bowe, 2010). However, Berger et al. (2004) argue 
that banks may be faced with increasing demand for loans during economic expansion, but 
restrain supply during recession to avoid possible losses caused by economic downturn. 
Whether pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical, these studies have pointed out the effect of 
business-cycles on bank charter value as predicated on capital adequacy. 
Emphasizing on capital requirements, Ahmad et al., (2009) evaluated the core 
determinants of bank capital using an unbalanced panel data to promulgate the implications 
of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. They intensified their work further by setting capital 
adequacy ratio as a dependent variable, proxy on ratio of non-performing loan to gross 
loan, market risk index, net interest margin, ratio of total liquid asset to total deposit, and 
size of the bank which was taken as natural log of total assets. In a similar study, Altunbas 
et al. (2000) realigned bank prudential regulations as those essentially concerned with 
capital risk asset ratio as put forward by the Basel committee. Thus, capital adequacy 
regulation is fundamentally aimed at constraining imprudent risk behavior by linking 
bank‟s risk exposures to its capital position. The financial ratios which relate capital to the 
corresponding banking risks have been conventionally used to regulate bank capital 
adequacy (Altunbas et al., 2000). For instance, Altunbas et al. (2000) on bank capital 
augmentation in Spain, specified a panel regression model for growth in bank capital as a 
function of expected rate of return on capital, portfolio risk (measured as ratio of public 
sector securities to total assets), liquidity, deposit growth rate, interest sensitivity gap, ratio 
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of non-performing loan to gross loan, ratio of off-balance sheet to total asset (as a measure 
of innovation), and operating efficiency of a bank (measured as ratio of total cost to total 
income). 
3.2 Panel Data Methodology 
Related studies such as Altunbas et al. (2000), Ahmad et al. (2009), and Fadzlan and 
Habibullah (2010), have applied panel data statistics to their work on capital adequacy in 
banks. Fadzlan and Habibullah incorporated GDP growth and inflation into their model to 
reflect sensitivity of bank performance to macroeconomic conditions. Flamini et al. (2009) 
proxy growth in bank capital as a dependent variable on other indicators such as liquidity 
ratio, earning to capital ratio, deposit growth rate, interest sensitivity ratio, among others. 
In a similar way, Konishi and Yasuda (2004) used panel data to empirically describe bank 
risk-taking operations in Japan where capital was used as a determinant of risk operation. 
For this study, application of the panel data method is tantamount to the fact that financial 
statements of banks in the same industry in most cases are correlated and may lead to 
multicollinearity. Therefore, analysis based on such findings could be spurious and 
misleading (Altunbas et al, 2000).  
Panel data analysis is used to investigate if risk management efficiency of a bank is 
sufficient to keep capital and liquidity requirements of the bank. For instance, Oladunjoye 
(2006) identified macroeconomic determinants as possible systemic threat to industrial 
index of Mauritania. This could be a key element, relevant in the case of Nigerian banking 
industry. As we know, since the inception of the global financial crisis, questions have 
been raised regarding the effectiveness of Basel framework in managing risk. In our 
finding, cyclicality of the industry was completely omitted in the Basel framework for risk 
management in banks. Athanasoglou et al. (2005) identified a positive response of bank 
profitability in Greek banking industry to business cycles, with the cyclical output being 
significant only at the extreme phase of the cycle. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) 
signified a positive linear relationship between bank suitability and the business cycle. 
Altunbas et al (2000) repositioned a panel data model using stochastic cost frontier 
methodology for efficiency and risk in Japanese banking. Panel data regression 
methodology is applied because technical efficiency is better studied with panel 
construction (See Baltagi and Griffin, 1988). Other advantages of panel data methodology 
is that, by controlling for individual heterogeneity, our model estimators can be less biased 
since the degree of freedom will be increased. 
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The panel data approach is a combination of cross-sectional and time series statistical 
analysis. By pooling the time series and cross-sectional dimensions of our data, panel 
inputs can enhance identification of stationarity and uncorrelated shocks within a model. 
The econometric form of the panel regression is: 
Yit = α + β Xit + πit   (πit  = i + i)     (1) 
where Yit is the dependent factor of i
th
 component in time t, Xit is the explanatory variable 
of i
th 
component in the corresponding period t.  Xit is said to be exogenous if it is 
uncorrelated with the disturbance πit. i is the unobservable individual effect, i is the 
residual of disturbance; α denotes intercept, and β is our estimating parameter.  
Panel data analysis may be in the form of general OLS, fixed effect model (FEM) or 
random effect model (REM). Under the FEM, unobservable disturbance terms ( i) are 
assumed to be fixed estimated parameter, with stochastic residual term ( i). FEM is 
suitable when considering individual effect of i
th component. Under this condition, β is 
assumed to be identical for all i
th
 components, but intercepts are different. The FE model 
can be stated as: 
Y = α1i + βXit + πit         (2) 
A common feature of the FEM is that it concentrates on micro-unit effects, neglecting 
variations in industry. This omission is corrected for in the random effect model (also 
known as the error components model). To statistically optimize available data, this study 
focuses on the random effect model. The random effect model is preferred to the fixed 
effect because of the random sampling pattern of the collated data. Baltagi (1995) suggests 
the fixed effects model would be more appropriate if we are focusing on specific set of 
observations. Although, using the fixed effects model for large number of observations 
may grossly lead to loss of degrees of freedom (Baltagi, 1995).  
To strengthen our preference for the random effects modeling, the Hausman 
specification test will be used to compare the fixed and random effects under the null 
hypothesis that the fixed effects and random effects model estimators differ substantially. 
If this hypothesis is rejected, it means the individual effects are probably correlated with 
the other regressors in the model. Using the REM in this case may generate spurious 
results. But if the null hypothesis is accepted, the random effect model will be justified for 
this study, implying that the micro-unit effects and regressors are uncorrelated (estimators 
differ substantially); otherwise the fixed effect modeling becomes more appropriate. The 
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Hausman test is carried out using White (1980) modeling for controlling cross section 
heteroscedasticity of the variables. 
3.3 Variable Description and Model Specification 
A panel regression model is specified to show the relationship between risk management 
efficiency in banks and other determinants of bank performance such as bank specific 
indicators and business cycles (cyclicality). This study covers a period of 7 financial years 
(2003-2009), taking 9 largest banks in terms of asset base. These 9 banks account for 78 
percent of total assets in the Nigerian banking industry.  
3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
Following Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997), Berger and Young (1997), Hitchins et al. (2001), 
Ojo (2008), and Ahmad et al. (2009) among others, this study sets capital adequacy as a 
dependent variable. In line with the Basel framework for risk management, capital 
adequacy stands as a prudential requirement for risk operations of a financial institution. In 
other words, the efficiency of the internal based risk models is based on capital sufficiency 
of the system. Chiu et al. (2009) analyzed a relationship between risk efficiency and 
bankruptcy taking capital adequacy ratio as proxy for risk management efficiency. If a 
bank‟s charter value in terms of its capital holding to risk portfolio falls short of the 
acceptable minimum, the system of internal risk management in that institution can be 
categorized as inefficient. Capital adequacy is defined in our model as a function of micro 
and macro determinants. The micro determinants are the bank-specific factors which are 
mainly influenced by the banking firm‟s policy. Such determinants include bank size (total 
asset), risk asset portfolio, interest sensitivity of assets to liability, management quality, 
and profitability. Others are the macro determinants which may include economic growth 
rate, inflation, and market interest rate.  
3.3.2 Bank-Specific Determinants 
The bank-specific determinants used in the modeling include credit to total asset ratio 
which is a measure for counterparty exposures of banks. Credit risk is a concept used to 
explain the default probability of a banking firm‟s loan portfolio. Interest sensitivity ratio is 
also included in the panel regression as a measure of sensitivity of bank‟s repriceable 
assets and liabilities to interest rate fluctuation. Otherwise referred to as “interest 
sensitivity gap”, is used to provide a general overview of their interest rate risk profile. The 
effect of interest rate changes on the assets and liabilities of a financial institution may be 
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analyzed by examining the extent to which such assets and liabilities are “interest rate 
sensitive” and by monitoring an institution‟s interest rate sensitivity gap. An asset or 
liability is said to be interest rate sensitive within a specific time period if it will mature or 
be repriced within that time period.  
Others determinants include profitability, measured by Rivard and Thomas (1997) as 
return on asset (ROA); operating efficiency, measured as net operating income divided by 
operating expense. The operating efficiency is also a good measure of management quality 
in ensuring that the assets are well priced to achieve a positive spread with cost of 
withholding liability. Market risk is taken as bank specific variable for this study because it 
is associated with operating leverage policy of the firm. When cost of fund is high in the 
market, the management may decide to liquidate portion of its assets rather than increasing 
its liabilities for financing its operation. Finally, liquidity as a bank-specific factor is 
included to show responsiveness of a bank to its short term obligation. It measures the 
ability of a bank to generate cash or turn quickly repriceable assets into cash.  
Figure 2 shows a risk management framework under which efficiency is determined by 
macro variables and other micro modules. 
 
 
Figure 2: Risk management framework 
Source: Author 
3.3.3 Macroeconomic Determinants 
In times of economic recession, loan defaults are more common. In this case, solvency 
position of a bank may be threatened because assets not performing in due course take 
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recourse to the capital of the bank. However, reaction of banks to changing risk 
environment is not uniform and depends on principles which are peculiar to individual 
banks, especially in terms of asset size and profitability. For the macroeconomic factors, 
significant changes in global financial markets adversely transits business cycles, slowing 
down business transactions in the money sector and making the social cost of funding bank 
assets high. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) and Bikker and Hu (2002) have shown 
that bank efficiency is susceptible to changing economic conditions despite the trend in the 
industry towards applying sophisticated financial engineering methods to mitigate risk that 
relates to economic cycle. Neely and Wheelock (1997) measured cyclicality of bank 
performance with GDP per capita. For this study, economic growth rate is proxy for 
cyclicality. 
In addition to the growth rate, inflation rate is included as a control variable for 
macroeconomic risk. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999); and Sufian and Habibullah 
(2010) identified a linkage between inflation and bank activities. 
Table 1: Summary of Variables, description and measurement 
Variable Apriori Explanation Measurement 
Regressand:    
CAR  Capital adequacy as a measure of 
solvency level forced by Capital 
depletion 
Regulatory Capital divided 
by Total Risk Weighted 
Asset 
Regressors:    
Bank-specific 
CRisk 
 
(+) 
 
Credit risk measures banks exposure 
to counterparty risk 
 
Loan/Total asset 
LQR (+) Insolvency risk forced by liquidity, in 
the case of bankruptcy where short 
term obligations cannot be met and 
the bank is forced to liquidate part of 
its fixed assets below their market 
worth 
Liquidity ratio: liquid 
assets divided by current 
liabilities 
ISR (-) Interest sensitivity ratio measures the 
sensitivity of banks to interest rate 
fluctuations based on its repriceable 
asset and repriceable liabilities 
Interest sensitive assets 
divided by interest 
sensitive liabilities 
ROA (+/-) Return on Bank‟s total assets Net income divided by 
total asset 
SIZE (+/-) This stands for total asset of the bank Natural logarithm of total 
asset 
MRisk (+)  Risk exposure of the bank to capital 
market participation. This is a core 
determinant of bank‟s capitalization 
Std dev of stock price 
divided by the mean for 
each 12 months period 
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(i.e., coefficient of 
variation) 
OPR (+) Operating efficiency as a measure of 
management quality 
Operating expenses 
divided by net operating 
income 
Macroeconomic 
GRT 
 
(+) 
 
Economic growth rate is proxy for 
cyclicality 
 
Selected from the world 
bank database 
INF (+/-) Domestic rate of inflation Selected from the world 
bank database 
3.4 Econometric Specification 
As previously discussed, risk management efficiency of a bank is determined by both 
bank-specific and macroeconomic factors. The functional form of this relationship is 
specified for the purpose of this study as: 
CARit = f (CRiskit , LQRit , ISRit , ROAit , SIZEit , MRiskit , OPRit , GRT, INF)
 
 
Econometrically expressed as: 
CARit = α + β1*CRiskit + β2*LQRit + β3*ISRit + β4*ROAit + β5*SIZEit 
      + β6*MRiskit + β7*OPRit + 1*GRT + 2*INF + πit   (3) 
(πit = vit + ui) 
„i‟ is a notation for individual banking firm, „t‟ stands for time period, and πit is the 
disturbance term. Decomposition of πit is to capture error from unobserved bank specific 
variables (vit), while uit is the robust standard error (RSE); α is the intercept, β and  are 
parameters for estimating bank-specific and macroeconomic variables respectively.  
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Panel Results 
We employ the panel econometrics to intensify a perspective of risk management 
efficiency in Nigerian banks. As noted by Kennedy (1998), estimation of panel data 
regression allows for controlling of individual heterogeneity, reduces generalized biasness, 
hence improving efficiency of our model by using data with more variability and reduced 
collinearity. Following the basic principles as stated in the methodology section, our 
specified regression model in eq(3) is estimated in different forms- panel OLS, fixed 
effect, and random effect.  The ratios used to estimate our model were computed based on 
data collected from sample bank‟s annual reports; other proxies were collected from 
institutional database such as World Bank, and CBN.  
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4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents a descriptive statistics of panel data variables for the selected 9 banks. The 
essence of these statistics is to indicate what level of disparity exists among the cross 
sectional variants. Looking at the table, statistics- based on sample data, shows a minimum 
credit risk coefficient of 0.129 and maximum of 0.580 for the industry, with 0.274 
coefficient of variation. The coefficient of variation shows the dispersion of cross section 
credit risk index away from the industry mean, which is estimated to be 0.346. The lower 
the coefficient of variation, the closer the unit credit risk index is to the industry average.  
Similarly, there is a wide gap in liquidity position among the banks, with minimum 
liquidity ratio of 0.112, maximum of 0.837 and coefficient of variation as 0.304. Most 
variables have shown common statistical feature in the industry. This could be due to the 
randomness of our cross section variables, where strong banks are taken alongside weaker 
ones for empirical study.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of panel data variants 
Descriptive Statistics for Selected Banks      
 CR LQR ROA LOGTA MRISK ISR OPR GRT INF 
 Mean  0.346  0.555  0.031  12.71  0.426  0.540  0.073  0.073  0.120 
 Max  0.580  0.837  0.192  14.33  0.869  1.283  0.301  0.105  0.178 
 Min  0.129  0.112 -0.001  10.02  0.240  0.145  0.025  0.057  0.054 
 Std. Dev.  0.095  0.169  0.034  1.162  0.137  0.217  0.059  0.019  0.039 
CV 0.274 0.304 1.096 0.091 0.321 0.401 0.808 0.260 0.325 
 
4.1.2 Estimates for Panel Regression Model 
We refer to Table 3 for panel regression results. The table presents three patterns of 
estimates: (i) the panel ordinary least square model; (ii) the fixed effect model estimates; 
and (iii) the random effects model estimates. To minimize the instance of weak estimating 
parameters, we ensure that the right model is chosen, interpreted and well analyzed. The 
Hausman test for correlated random effects is included to technically provide the best 
model estimates for our data (see Table 5 for result). Hausman test basically considers if 
the variance in the estimates of the random and fixed effect models are significant to cause 
biasness of the modeled parameters. Where the variance is statistically significant, there is 
a likelihood of unobserved individual heterogeneity being uncorrelated to the independent 
variables; that is, the micro-unit effects and regressors are uncorrelated, implying that the 
random effect model estimates are preferred. 
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Results for Hausman test (chi-sq statistics) failed to reject the null hypothesis that 
unobserved firm specific heterogeneity are uncorrelated with regressors and so, we would 
be concentrating our analysis on estimates provided by the random effect model. However, 
Table 3 presents all results from different procedures for a more comparative 
interpretation. Furthermore, we adjust for heteroscedasticity to ensure that variance in 
disturbance terms is consistent over time. According to Baltagi (1995), OLS model may 
become inefficient in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Therefore, we use a general least 
squares (GLS) estimator to estimate the error variance, with an assumption that disturbance 
in the model concedes to panel specific autoregressive process, allowing for 
heteroscedasticity across cross sections (Baltagi, 1995). 
Consolidating on the Basel capital adequacy requirement for risk mitigation, share of 
bank capital to total asset is expected to stand in for risk position of the bank. Thus, apriori 
theoretical expectation for relationship between bank capital adequacy ratio and credit risk 
is positive. Results in Table 3 follow the apriori with a positive impact of credit risk on 
capital adequacy position of Nigerian banks. The standardized t-statistic shows that the 
parameter estimate is statistically significant at 0.01 level. Comparing the result of the 
random effect estimate with fixed and OLS, parameter holds same position for the 
coefficient and significance. Efficiency of risk managing a bank‟s loan portfolio through 
capital augmentation therefore is substantiated in the case of Nigerian banks. 
In terms of Liquidity, it is important for a bank to ensure that its current assets are well 
matched with current liabilities. In other words, a bank with low liquidity is prone to 
having untimed operational misadventure whereby it cannot fulfill its short term 
obligations to customers. In a situation as one mentioned above, a bank may have to 
liquidate part of its asset or take from its capital to service such obligations. This means 
low liquidity will affect capital ratio negatively and so, has positive movement with capital 
adequacy ratio. From our empirical results, the random effect model estimate for LQR 
parameter is positive. This shows that Nigerian banks risk management practices are 
positively associated with their liquidity position. For all the models, LQR parameter is 
statistically significant and positive at 1 percent.  
An important variable in our panel model is the ROA. The ROA is used to incorporate 
bank profitability as a bank-specific determinant of risk management efficiency. Saunders 
and Wilson (2001) prove a nexus between bank capital and bank charter value using bank 
profitability as a measure of future prospect of the banking firm. This points out that a 
better performing bank with good returns on asset and consistent management policies can 
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be well capitalized for future operations. Bodie et al. (2008) explained earning and pay-out 
policy of a firm, where financial managers try to ensure a smooth dividend payment over 
time. When returns are excessively high, managers usually decide to plowback part of it as 
capital. With these two cases, it is expected that a positive association exist between capital 
position and profitability of a bank as indicated in our study as ROA.  
Empirically, we find a negative result for impact of ROA on CAR, going against the 
theoretical expectation and contradicting findings from Cebenoyan et al. (1999), and 
Saunders and Wilson (2001). We trace this unusual position to the Nigerian banking crises 
of 2009, after the industry had been previously hit by the global financial mishaps. During 
the crisis, bank assets declined significantly and the industry witnessed a high default on 
loans and declining interest income. In addition, the federal monetary authority ordered all 
banks to make provision for impaired loans and adjust their old financial records to provide 
for the loan losses. This cleared historical book returns of the banks, with some banks 
signaling unexpected losses in their revised book. Because of data problem which is 
peculiar to developing world, this study was subjected to using 9 out of 24 banks operating 
in the industry. A perception of total asset as a determinant of risk management efficiency 
using the available data shows that bank size is not a relevant factor. 
 Within the context of the Nigerian banking industry, exposure of banks to market risk 
has been found to be a significant bank-specific determinant of their risk management 
efficiency. An iteration of our proficient random effect model for market risk determinant 
shows a positive link of the variable on risk efficiency of banks. This follows the apriori 
reasoning earlier stated, suggesting that when a banking firm is exposed to price 
uncertainties, risk management would be efficient at the instance where sufficient reserve 
capital is on standby. Hence, well capitalized Nigerian banks are in better position to 
sustain operation at the windfall of the market. The market risk under this study is 
measured using the coefficient of variation to index price stability of bank equities.  
Interest sensitivity ratio is the ratio of interest sensitive assets over interest sensitive 
liabilities. When interest-sensitivity ratio is greater than unity, increasing interest rate will 
have positive impact on bank earnings but there would be a negative impact on net worth 
of the bank because the value of assets would be declining faster than the liabilities. 
Consequently, the equity capital of the bank will forcefully decline. Our regression table 
shows a positive coefficient for the ISR parameter under the random effect model. This 
may be theoretically correct if the interest sensitivity ratio is less than unity; though fixed 
effect and panel OLS results differ. Under this uncommon circumstance as seen in the 
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random effects coefficient, the interest sensitive liability of the bank can be more than the 
interest sensitive asset, implying that increasing rate of interest will reduce net interest 
margin and increase net worth of the bank, since the liability side of the book will be 
decreasing at a faster rate than the asset. However, the Nigerian case is not synonymous 
with less than unity asset-liability position, but rather caused by poor asset-pricing and 
weak floating interest rate regime caused by market indiscipline and sharp practices of 
bank managers. The t-statistic for this parameter has proven to be statistically insignificant 
for the random effect model but significant for the fixed effects and general form models at 
10 percent and 5 percent levels respectively. 
Concerning operation efficiency as bank-specific determinant of risk management 
efficiency, plowing hypothetical inputs to substantiate our theoretical claims, we find a 
negative impact of OPR on efficiency. OPR has been computed as net operating income 
divided by operating expenses. If operating efficiency ratio increase, it means the 
management is better positioned for profit and the impact of this on capital is expected to 
be positive. Model estimator for this parameter is estimated at -0.1395, indicating a unit 
increase in management efficiency index will result in 0.1395 reduction in capital 
adequacy ratio and risk efficiency of the bank. Under the general OLS model, a null 
hypothesis is rejected implying that the parameter is statistically significant. Fixed and 
random effect model estimates hold sway to the conjured general OLS position but are 
both statistically insignificant.  
On the macro-determinants of risk management efficiency in Nigerian banks, economic 
growth and inflation were proxies. Result in Table 3 shows that economic growth which is 
a proxy for business cyclicality has positive impact on capital adequacy of Nigerian banks. 
By implication, Nigerian banking industry is pro-cyclical to economic cycles. In times of 
economic boom, more capital can be easily sourced from the financial market to buffer for 
possible shocks from risk-taking operations of the bank, but on the other hand, recession 
period is a bitter experience for banks. During recession, cost of capital is high and default 
rate on loans are high as well, subjecting bank management to a difficult risk management 
task. Regarding inflation, the random effect estimate shows a negative coefficient. In 
recent times, inflation rate has remained very high in Nigeria, with double digits. Since 
Nigeria operates a floating interest rate and floating exchange rate regime, high inflation 
has caused interest rates to remain high. This makes financing decision more difficult task 
for banks, with high rates of interest, cost of funds are high and also equity holders usually 
demand for higher returns. In this case, capital augmentation is an expensive process due to 
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increasing inflation. Result from regression is consistent with this theoretical perspective, 
though t-statistic tells us the variable parameter is not significant in determining risk 
efficiency of banks in Nigeria. 
Table 3: Estimates of Parameters for Panel Regression Model 
Independent 
Variable 
Regression Models 
Panel OLS Fixed Effect (EGLS) Random Effect 
(EGLS) 
Crisk 0.7523* 
(5.8946) 
0.6110* 
(4.1744) 
0.4533* 
(3.8049) 
LQR 0.2161* 
 (5.5747) 
 0.2501* 
(6.2299) 
 0.1711* 
(3.5216) 
ROA -0.9871* 
(-5.3091)  
-1.0691* 
(-5.5845)  
 -1.1198* 
(-6.7044) 
LOGTA
1
 0.0281 
 (1.4444) 
 0.0097 
(0.6414) 
- 
MRisk 0.3134* 
 (9.1429) 
 0.3631* 
(8.2703) 
 0.3608* 
(8.1312) 
ISR -0.1339** 
 (-2.3779) 
 -0.0968*** 
(-1.7881) 
 0.0219 
(0.4378) 
OPR -0.9018* 
 (-3.8687) 
-0.0093 
(-0.0762)  
 -0.1395 
(-1.1808) 
GRT 0.9641** 
 (2.0850) 
 1.0612** 
(2.0787) 
 1.1787** 
(2.3909) 
INF 0.2332 
 (1.4820) 
 0.0058 
(0.0273) 
 -0.1778 
(-1.2204) 
Constant -0.7238* 
 (-2.6104) 
 -0.4900** 
(-2.3330) 
 -0.3064* 
(-5.7619) 
        
R-Square  0.881  0.870  0.809 
F-statistic  31.752  17.755  28.736 
Prob(F-stat)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Durbin Watson  1.94  1.89  2.03 
The results shown in parentheses are absolute values of the t-statistic, with 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 implying 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The panel 
Regression results were carried out on E-VIEWS 6.0. 
4.1.3 Robustness Test  
Now we look at the sufficiency of the model by analyzing the coefficient of multi- 
determination, F-statistics, Durbin Watson test for autocorrelation and covariance analysis 
                                                 
1
 According to Baltagi (1995), estimation of random effects model requires that number of variables should 
be less than the number of cross-sections. To meet this condition, bank size (LOGTA) is omitted for the 
random effects model since it is insignificant under the fixed effects and the OLS models.  
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for multicollinearity. Durbin Watson result for autocorrelation shows there is no first order 
autocorrelation in the models. The autocorrelation result supports that error terms are not 
correlated and series could be adjudged stationary. The F-statistics test of the significance 
of the model has also strengthened the reliability of the model, significant at 1 percent 
level. The R
2
 coefficient is used in determining the explanatory power of our independent 
variables as relate changes in dependent variable. For our model, R
2 
is 0.809 under the 
random effect model. This means that about 80 percent variation in capital ratio is 
explained by changes in selected bank-specific and macroeconomic variants. 
Table 4: Covariance coefficients for Multicollinearity Check 
Covariance 
(Correlation) 
Covariance Analysis  
LOGTA  CR  LQR  ROA  MRISK  ISR  OPR  GRT  INF  
LOGTA  1.329 
(1.000) 
                
CR  0.038 
(0.352) 
0.009 
(1.000) 
        
LQR  -0.017 
(-0.086) 
-0.007 
(-0.427) 
0.028 
(1.000) 
       
ROA  0.007 
(0.177) 
0.000 
(0.112) 
-0.002 
(-0.319) 
0.001 
(1.000) 
      
MRISK  0.024 
(0.153) 
-0.001 
(-0.058) 
-0.001 
(-0.060) 
-0.001 
(-0.121) 
0.019 
(1.000) 
     
ISR  0.043 
(0.174) 
0.018 
(0.467) 
-0.014 
(-0.389) 
0.000 
(-0.026) 
0.001 
(0.028) 
0.047 
(1.000) 
    
OPR  -0.043 
(-0.633) 
0.000 
(-0.066) 
-0.002 
(-0.241) 
0.000 
(0.071) 
-0.001 
(-0.118) 
0.001 
(0.061) 
0.003 
(1.000) 
   
GRT  -0.017 
(-0.763) 
-0.001 
(-0.377) 
0.001 
(0.242) 
0.000 
(-0.026) 
-0.001 
(-0.361) 
-0.001 
(-0.269) 
0.001 
(0.442) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
  
INF  -0.022 
(-0.494) 
0.000 
(0.055) 
-0.001 
(-0.167) 
0.000 
(0.054) 
0.000 
(0.047) 
0.001 
(0.077) 
0.001 
(0.349) 
0.000 
(0.434) 
0.00 
(1.0) 
         
Note: 
a. The notations used in summarizing results as denoted on table 3, 4 & 5 are labelled as follows: CAR represents capital 
adequacy ratio; CRisk is credit risk estimator; LQR is liquidity ratio; ROA is return on asset; LOGTA stands for the 
natural logarithm of total asset; MRisk Proxy for market risk. In addition, ISR is label for interest sensitivity ratio; OPR 
as operation efficiency; GRT is a Proxy measure for economic growth, and finally INF is used to denote inflation.  
b. The results shown in parentheses are absolute values of correlation matrix 
Table 4 presents correlation coefficients and covariance of explanatory variables 
required for testing for multicollinearity. According to the assumptions of the classical 
regression model, when explanatory variables within a model are correlated, the model is 
not best. Correlation among regressors weakens the efficiency of our parameter estimates. 
The table above tells us none of the paired regressors are significantly correlated and the 
covariance coefficients all approximates zero. This implies there is no multicollinearity 
within the model and so, our model can be best estimate of the regression line.  
22 
Table 5: Hausman’s test 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Cross-section random 0.281307 8 0.31093 
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
CR 0.611045 0.453333 -0.004564 0.0492 
LQR 0.250165 0.171127 0.000654 0.0021 
ROA -1.069112 -1.119840 0.002973 0.0728 
MRISK 0.363112 0.360824 0.000094 0.2665 
ISG -0.096891 0.021962 -0.000328 0.0000 
OPR -0.009376 -0.139573 0.009464 0.2805 
GRT 1.061222 1.178746 0.058749 0.1807 
INF 0.005803 -0.177815 0.006679 0.2810 
 
To check the impact of the financial crisis on capital adequacy of Nigerian banks, a test 
was further carried out. Since the main economic damage was more pronounced in 2007 
and 2008, a dummy variable was included in a model to test the relevance of the crisis. But 
results show that the global financial crisis is not a significant factor. Hence we removed 
the dummy variable and base our findings on the general model specified in section~3.4. 
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation  
A core objective of this study is to empirically investigate what are the key determinants of 
bank risk management efficiency in Nigeria. We examine a long run equilibrium among 
financial ratios with uncertain coefficients, macroeconomic variables, and capital ratio 
which is proxy for risk management efficiency. Panel regression methodology was 
employed to envelope both bank-specific and macro-determinants. Considering our 
findings from the panel regression analysis, it has been established that macro-determinant- 
economic growth, has positive impact on risk management efficiency among Nigerian 
banks; inflation is negatively related to bank‟s capital adequacy, in accordance to apriori 
theoretical expectation.  
Empirical findings based on this study suggest that risk management among Nigerian 
banks has not been efficient. Prior to introduction of Basel II rules to the system, banks 
where under-capitalized. The institution of the 2004 Accord ensued banks to recapitalize, 
with banks having to meet a new capital base of 25 billion naira (165 million US$) 
minimum. At that point, banks were perceived to be strong enough to absorb operational 
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shocks, but the financial crisis proved otherwise, with 5 out of the 24 banks being forced to 
a troubled position and 8 others were advised to recapitalize. Whereas, capital buffers for 
operational risk, it has its own determinants. Our scientific analysis shows that bank capital 
adequacy is positively associated with liquidity, bank size and market risk. Bank size from 
results is proven to be statistically insignificant.  
As expected, credit risk shows a positive impact on capital position of Nigerian banks. 
By implication, an average Nigerian bank is efficient in managing its credit portfolio since 
evidence shows they have sustained adequate capital for exposures from credit activities. 
Management quality, which has been measured as operating efficiency of the banks, 
indicates a negative impact on risk management efficiency. We identify this to be caused 
by competition in the industry which makes loan availability a factor for attracting 
customers in Nigeria. This makes banks‟ written policy flexible, a feature of weak 
management. Also, risk performance in Nigerian banking industry has reiterated it is pro-
cyclical considering the regression outcome for the economic growth parameter. This is 
contrary to the finding by Francis and Osborne (2009) in a study on UK banking industry 
which supports an argument that risk capital ratios are counter-cyclical. Economic growth 
is a significant determinant of bank stability, whereas inflation is not.  
Juxtaposing the essence of risk management in banks, and the effectiveness of the Basel 
framework for risk management, there is a substantial argument against the efficiency of 
the framework itself. Empirical findings from several studies such as Francis and Osborne 
(2009), Borio and Drehmann (2009), and Clement (2010), including this has shown that 
risk management efficiency in banks is co-determined by macroeconomic factors which 
vary with cycles. These macroeconomic factors have not been well integrated into the 
Basel guide. Although credit ratings have been suggested to qualify sovereign risk, the 
core macro-determinant of performance such as economic growth has been omitted.  
Saurina (2009) have suggested the use of through the cycle inputs rather than risk 
models. In addition, pro-cyclical risk process can be mitigated if monetary authorities at 
regular intervals examine the risk position of banking firms to avert extreme losses; 
prioritizing future expectations over present profitability.  
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